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State government-mandated social distancing measures have helped to slow the growth of the
COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Current predictive models of the development of COVID-
19, especially after mitigation efforts, are largely extrapolations from data collected in other coun-
tries. Since most states enacted stay-at-home orders towards the end of March, the resulting effects
of social distancing should be reflected in the death and infection counts by the end of April. Using
the data available through April 25th, we investigate the change in the infection rate due to the mit-
igation efforts and project death and infection counts through September 2020 for some of the most
heavily impacted states: New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois and Louisiana.
We find that with the current mitigation efforts, five of those six states have reduced their base
reproduction number to a value less than one, stopping the exponential growth of the pandemic.
We also projected different scenarios after the mitigation is relaxed. Analysis for other states can
be found at https://covid19projection.org/.
I. INTRODUCTION
As of April 25, there are 2.8 million confirmed cases
and close to 200,000 deaths attributed to COVID-19 in
the world, with over 0.9 million cases and close to 52,000
deaths in the United States. The first confirmed case of
COVID-19 in the United States occurred in Washington
State on January 20, 2020. Until early March, the num-
ber of reported cases remained rather low, with most of
them residing in the states of Washington, New York,
and California. However, since early March, the disease
has spread to all of the states, with both recorded deaths
and infections growing at alarming rates in many states.
Between mid-March and early-April, most states issued
stay-at-home (SaH) orders.
Since the effects of social distancing measures in the
United States have not be known until recently, most
studies of the progress of the epidemic are largely based
on extrapolations from the effects of similar strategies in
other countries. However, by mid-April most states have
shown signs of slowing the initial exponential growth of
infection. Understanding the effects of mitigation efforts
based on local data is important, as countries have im-
plemented different degrees of social distancing measures
and their effects simply cannot be translated between
countries. Moreover, understanding the effect of miti-
gation is key to predicting the effects of relaxing those
efforts. How will the timing affect the number of in-
fections? What measures need to be enforced to keep
the infection rate sufficiently low to prevent exponential
growth again? For these reasons, we expand our prelim-
inary study of the early stage of COVID-19 epidemic in
Louisiana1. As more data is available, we now estimate
the death rate and recovery rate of those in quarantine,
which allows us to predict the death count, positive con-
firmed count, and perhaps more importantly the infected
yet unidentified count after social distancing measures.
The goal of this study is to extract the dynamics of
COVID-19 in some of the most heavily impacted states
and to investigate the change of the infection rate after
the effects of the stay-at-home orders. We then model
several scenarios with different dates for the release of the
stay-at-home orders and different hypothetical increases
of the infection rate. We also compare our results to
the widely publicized model by the Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)2.
In the section II, we present the model. In the sec-
tion III, we present the method of extracting the param-
eters for the model. In the section IV, we present the
results for six stares, these include New York, New Jer-
sey, Michigan, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Louisiana. In
the section V, we discuss the error sources and the possi-
ble improvement of the projection. In the appendix, we
benchmark our projection to that of the IHME.
II. MODEL
We use the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR)
model3,4 , modified to consider the number of quaran-
tined people. Similar modifications on the SIR model
have been considered elsewhere to model the spread of
COVID-195–34. The equations defining the dynamics of
the model are as follows:
dS(t)
dt
= −βS(t)I(t)
N
, (1)
dI(t)
dt
= β
S(t)I(t)
N
− (α+ η)I(t), (2)
dQ(t)
dt
= ηI(t)− δ(t)Q(t)− ξ(t)Q(t), (3)
dR(t)
dt
= ξ(t)Q(t) + αI(t), (4)
dC(t)
dt
= δ(t)Q(t), (5)
where N is the total population size, S is the suscepti-
ble population count, I is the unidentified while infec-
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2tious population count, Q is the number of identified
quarantined cases, R includes the number of recovered
patients, and C is the number of deaths. The model is
characterized by the following parameters: β is the in-
fection rate, η is the detection rate, α is the recovery
rate of asymptomatic people, ξ is the recovery rate of
the quarantined patients, and δ is the casualty rate of
the quarantined. We further assume that all casualties
had been in quarantine prior to death and we consider
that only ξ and δ have time dependence.
The total death count at time t, D(t), can be estimated
as:
D(t) =
∫ t
0
dC(τ)
dτ
dτ . (6)
The confirmed positive count is P (t) = Q(t) + RQ(t) +
C(t), where RQ(t) are the recovered patients previously
in quarantine. P (t) can be estimates as:
P (t) =
∫ t
0
dP (τ)
dτ
dτ (7)
=
∫ t
0
(
dQ(τ)
dτ
+
dRQ(τ)
dτ
+
dC(τ)
dτ
)
dτ ,
P (t) =
∫ t
0
ηI(τ) dτ . (8)
III. METHOD
We determine two sets of parameters, one before the
stay-at-home order and the other one after the social
distancing measures are in place. The method for esti-
mating the model parameters from the data prior to the
stay-at-home orders have been discussed in our previous
work.1 We repeat our approach here for completeness of
the present paper.
Adequate testing for COVID-19 remains limited in the
US. For this reason, accurately predicting the trajectory
of the spread of COVID-19 by relying on the number of
confirmed cases alone is a rather questionable approach,
especially in the early stages when the percentage of peo-
ple tested was very small, and the spread by infected
people who were asymptomatic was significant. Alterna-
tively, the number of fatalities attributed to COVID-19
combined with the mortality rate may be a more reliable
estimator of the dynamics of the virus spread. Therefore,
we extract the dynamics of COVID-19 from the death
counts supplemented with the number of confirmed cases.
At the beginning of the epidemic, only a small frac-
tion of the population is infected and we can assume the
susceptible population count is very close to that of the
total population, S ∼ N . With this assumption one can
decouple in Eq. 2 the infected population count from the
other variables in the model to obtain:5,7
I(t) = I(0) exp [(β − (α+ η))t]. (9)
At the beginning of the virus spread, the number of
quarantined patients is also small compared with the
number of infected and we are able to simplify Eq. 3
to obtain:
Q(t) =
η
β − (α+ η)I(t). (10)
Combining Eqs. 10 and 5, we relate the rate of in-
crease in the number of casualties with the number
of infected people at the early stage of the epidemic:
dC(t)
dt
= δ(t)
η
β − (α+ η)I(t) = δ0I(t), where δ0 is the
mortality rate. Finally the casualty count can be written
as:
C(t) =
δ0I(0)
β − (α+ η) exp [(β − (α+ η))t]. (11)
At the beginning of the epidemic, exponential growth
of the number of fatalities is a reasonable assumption
since the mechanisms for slowing the dynamics, such as
improved detection and social distancing, are delayed in
time. To find the initial exponent, β − (α + η), and the
prefactor, the death count and the number of deaths per
day are fit to Eq. 11 and its derivative
(
dC(t)
dt
)
, with the
first date with one death taken as t = 0. We perform
a three-day moving average to smooth the data prior to
the fit. We also discard data with less than ten deaths
and use the data for the next ten days. All states in this
study were still in the exponential growth phase at the
last day used for the fitting of the exponent. To identify
the initial number of infected people, I(0), δ0 must be
estimated.
The mortality rate, δ0, is estimated by combining the
accumulated mortality rate data and the median time
between infection and death. The median time between
infection and the onset of symptoms is about five days,
while the median time between the onset of symptoms
and death is eight days35–38. It is worth noting that the
distribution of these time intervals is close to log-normal,
thus a more sophisticated analysis should include the ef-
fects of the non-self-averaging behavior of the distribu-
tion. Only the median values are used in the present
work.
The accumulated mortality rate is estimated to be
2.3%39. Notably, the mortality rate does indeed vary
by region. This may be due to the rate of testing as
well as the capacity of health care facilities. For areas
in which hospitals have been overrun, the death rate
would be much higher. Notwithstanding these uncer-
tainties, assuming that the health care facilities have not
yet been overrun, the mortality rate is estimated to be
δ0 ≈ 0.023
5 + 8
≈ 0.0018/day.
We also estimate the recovery rate of asymptomatic
people, α, based on our current knowledge of the epi-
demic. Assuming that the average time to recovery or
death from infection are both 13 days and that half of
the infected never show any symptoms40, we estimate
3α = 0.5/13 ≈ 0.0385. This is likely closer to an upper
bound of the estimate, this parameter could easily be
smaller in reality.
We estimate η by minimizing the χ2 of the total num-
ber of deaths and confirmed cases, and their derivatives
(daily number of deaths and daily number of new cases)
for the last five days of the ten-day interval we are con-
sidering after the death count rise to ten deaths. After
obtaining η, we can also infer the infection rate β and
the reproduction number R0 ≈ β/(η + α).7
As opposed to our previous work1, in which less data
was available, we also estimate both the death rate, δ(t),
and the recovery rate of the quarantined, ξ(t), from the
raw data of confirmed cases and death count as a function
of time. Based on the assumption that the average time
from the onset of symptoms to death or recovery is eight
days, δ(t) + ξ(t) = 1/8 = 0.125. For days between the
fourth and the eleventh (t ≥ 4 and t ≤ 11), we assume:
δ(t) ≈ 1
8
D(t+ 4)−D(t− 4)
P (t− 4)−D(t− 4) . (12)
For day 12 and beyond (t ≥ 12) we assume:
δ(t) ≈ 1
8
D(t+ 4)−D(t− 4)
P (t− 4)− P (t− 12)−D(t− 4) . (13)
We assume δ for days 1 to 3 is equal to our estimate
for day 4. In order to make projections we also consider
that for days in the future the value of δ is equal to the
value the last day with data available. This is not an
unreasonable approximation, as we find the value of δ is
more or less stable after the stay-at-home order becomes
effective. Fig. 1 displays the values of δ in Louisiana for
days between March 16 and April 19. From the value
of δ on April 19 we can extract a mortality rate of 2%
at this time to compare with a maximum of 6.5% at the
beginning of the epidemic. Estimates for other states
behave in a similar way.
FIG. 1: Estimate of the casualty rate of the quarantined cases
as a function of time, δ(t), for the state of Louisiana.
State β η R0 I(0) dr r R
SaH
0 t = 0 SaH(t)
NY 0.484 0.070 4.46 1723 16(9) 0.13 0.58 3/15 3/22(7)
NJ 0.436 0.091 3.36 132 24(14) 0.20 0.67 3/11 3/21(10)
MI 0.449 0.057 4.69 881 13(8) 0.11 0.52 3/19 3/24(5)
MA 0.445 0.130 2.64 884 13(10) 0.33 0.87 3/21 3/24(3)
IL 0.421 0.107 2.89 481 14(11) 0.35 1.01 3/18 3/21(3)
LA 0.379 0.040 4.83 479 18(10) 0.05 0.24 3/15 3/23(8)
TABLE I: Parameters for different states: the initial infection
rate β, the detention rate η, the initial reproduction number
R0 ≈ β/(η + α), the initial number of infected people at the
day of the first confirmed death I(0), the first date that so-
cial distancing measures are effectively stabilizing the number
of daily deaths (in number of days since SaH order) dr, the
reduction in the infection rate r, the reproduction number af-
ter SaH orders RSaH0 , and the day of the first death and the
date of the SaH order. Massachusetts has not implemented a
stay-at-home order but closed non-essential services on March
24th. The recovery rate of asymptomatic people α = 0.0385
is assumed as a constant of the model.
Finally, we look at the effect of the current mitigation
efforts. Within the present model, there are two ma-
jor routes to slow the initial exponential growth of the
epidemic, either to decrease the infection rate β or to
increase the testing rate η. Increasing the recovery rate
of unidentified infectious people, α, can also reduce the
spread, but this is unlikely to be achieved. It is expected
that the stay-at-home orders reduce the infection rate
but do not influence the testing rate. However, the effect
is not universal but rather highly dependent on the mea-
sures imposed. Instead of extrapolating the data from
other areas, we choose to determine it from the casualty
and confirmed case counts. In addition, there is a time
delay for the stay-at-home order to influence the number
of cases and deaths. Therefore we consider the effect of
the social distancing measures to be reflected in two pa-
rameters, the reduction of the infection rate, r, and the
first day when the measurements are effective, dr. We
determine both parameters by minimizing the χ2 of the
values and daily changes of the death and the confirmed
count for the five days between April 20 and 24.
With δ(t) as calculated in Eqs. 12 and 13, together
with the initial number of infected, I(0), and the rest
of parameters as shown in Table I, we can solve the dy-
namics of the epidemic and estimate the death count,
confirmed count, and perhaps more importantly the in-
fected but unidentified count, I(t), in each state.
IV. RESULTS AND PROJECTIONS
We chose six states with high death counts to test our
projections. These include New York (NY), New Jersey
(NJ), Michigan (MI), Massachusetts (MA), Illinois (IL),
and Louisiana (LA). The casualty and the confirmed case
4FIG. 2: Log-scale of the daily death count (black solid curve), total number of casualties (dashed red curve), and total number
of confirmed cases (dash-dotted blue curve) as function of time for six states: New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts,
Illinois and Louisiana. The data for the number of deaths and cases is included as circles.
5counts are obtained from the database of the New York
Times.41 Table I displays the parameters of our model for
these states. In particular, we can compare the reproduc-
tion number in the exponential growing phase of the epi-
demic R0 ≈ β
η + α
, with an effective RSaH0 ≈
rβ
η + α
after
the SaH order become effective. While the R0 values are
between 2.64 for Massachusetts and 4.83 for Louisiana,
RSaH0 values are between 1.01 for Illinois and 0.24 for
Louisiana, showing that SaH orders have been effective
to reduce R0 to values less than one and control the ex-
ponential growth of the disease in most states.
Fig. 2 shows our predictions for the daily casualties,
total number of casualties, and total number of confirmed
cases for six states: New York, New Jersey, Michigan,
Massachusetts, Illinois and Louisiana. Additionally, the
casualty and confirmed case counts through April 25th
that are used to find the model parameters are included
in the plots. First, we see that all the states have left the
exponential phase and are bending their curves towards a
quasi-linear region about one to two weeks after the SaH
orders. However, the number of cases and fatalities in
Illinois are still rapidly growing, albeit at a smaller rate
than before.
The results of the model agree reasonably well with
the real casualty and case counts, in particular with the
casualty counts used to estimate the initial exponent of
the epidemic growth. The worst fits occurs with New
York and New Jersey. Those are also the states with the
largest number of cases. Difficulties in modeling New Jer-
sey also appear in other models42. The issue might be
related with the fact that NJ provides suburban housing
for two large metropolitan areas, New York and Philadel-
phia. An analysis by metropolitan area instead of by
state might be more meaningful in the case of New Jersey.
Table II displays the current, as April 25, casualty and
confirmed case counts alongside our projections through
September 1.
It is worthwhile to compare our results with the widely
used Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)
Current Current Projected Projected
State (4/25) (04/25) (9/1) (9/1)
deaths cases deaths cases
NY 16,599 282,174 25,842 339,826
NJ 5,863 105,523 12,259 143,672
MI 3,274 37,203 5,882 45,801
MA 2,730 53,348 8,414 96,000
IL 1,884 41,777 13,746 199,474
LA 1,644 26,512 2,789 33,325
TABLE II: The total number of casualties and confirmed
cases as of April 25 and projected total deaths and cases by
September 1, in six states.
FIG. 3: Model predictions for Louisiana: daily death count
(solid black curve), total number of casualties (dashed red
curve), number of unidentified infected (green dotted curve),
count of quarantined patients (double-dot-dashed maroon
curve), total number of confirmed cases (dot-dashed blue
curve), and total number of recovered people (solid magenta
curve) as a function of time.
model2. The projected total death counts of all six states
we analyze are well within the 95% confidence interval of
the IHME model on their update by Apr 25, except for
Illinois. We emphasize that the present analysis is en-
tirely based on the dynamical modeling of disease spread-
ing with the necessary parameter inferred from death and
confirmed counts alone. There is no extrapolation or in-
terpolation of data from other countries or regions.
Unlike models based on statistical inference, the
present model can provide additional information on the
epidemic dynamics. We focus on further analyzing the
predictions for Louisiana by plotting the full set of vari-
ables. In particular, this provides a hint on the number
of infected but never identified cases. Additionally, the
total number of infections can also be inferred. Fig. 3
displays the daily death count
(
dC(t)
dt
)
, total number of
casualties (D(t)), number of unidentified infected (I(t)),
number of quarantined patients (Q(t)), total number of
confirmed cases (P (t)), and total number of recovered
people
(∫ t
0
dR(τ)
dτ
dτ
)
as a function of time. Note that
by September 1, the total number of recovered people
(previously in quarantined or unidentified) is 62,509, al-
most double of the 33,325 projected confirmed cases.
A criteria to relax the social distancing measures for
models based on statistical inference methods is for the
number of daily confirmed case to drop below one per
million population2. Since the present model consider the
dynamics, we can estimate the increase in the infection
and death count by proposing an increase in the infection
rate due to relaxing the stay-at-home order.
6FIG. 4: Total number of cases as a function of time for several
scenarios: full mitigation efforts are in place (solid black line),
the infection rate, β, returns to 25% (dashed curves) and 50%
(dotted curves) of its value prior to the SaH order at three
different times, May 1, May 16, June 1.
We explore possible scenarios after the release of SaH
orders for the state of Louisiana. We represent the ef-
fect of relaxing the mitigation efforts by the increase of
the infection rate, β. Because the number of suscepti-
ble persons, S(t), has not changed sufficiently to reach
herd immunity, if the value of β reverts to the one be-
fore mitigation, the number of infected people will again
grow exponentially. We investigate the effect of increas-
ing β at different times, e.g. May 1, May 16, and June 1.
How much β will increase once SaH measures are relaxed
depends on various factors, such as possible limitation
of mass gatherings and the proportion of the population
wearing personal protective gear. Fig. 4 and 5 show pre-
dictions for the number of confirmed cased and fatalities,
respectively, for different scenarios. We assume that the
infection rate, β, increases to 25% and 50% of its value
prior to the SaH order. We see that if β increases to
25%, confirmed cases and deaths grow sub-exponentially
but with a larger slope than the case with full mitigation
efforts. If β increases to 50%, both confirmed cases and
fatalities will grow exponentially again. We notice that
the delay on relaxing the mitigation does not help sub-
stantially to lower the number of infections in the long
term.
V. DISCUSSION
We analyze the dynamics of the COVID-19 spreading
on six states. By late April, most states have been under
stay-at-home orders for almost a month, and the effects of
social distancing are reflected in the data. Additionally,
we are able to estimate the recovery rate and the death
FIG. 5: Total number of death counts as a function of time
for several scenarios: full mitigation efforts are in place (solid
black line), the infection rate, β, returns to 25% (dashed
curves) and 50% (dotted curves) of its value prior to the stay-
at-home order at three different times, May 1, May 16 and
June 1.
rate for the patients under quarantine. This allows us to
expand our previous study1 and estimate the number of
infectious but unidentified people, which is largely absent
in models based on statistical inference. Our results con-
firm the widely believed speculation that the number of
infected is much larger than the confirmed positive cases.
We find that by late April the infection rate and the
effective reproduction number in all the states have been
significantly reduced. However, Illinois is still in the
phase of increasing daily death and confirmed positive
counts by April 25th (see Table I). Within this model,
we do not assume that the death count is exponentially
decrease after social distancing measures, but we use the
current data to estimate the dynamics of the disease
spreading.
We also provide possible scenarios of reopening with
a focus in Louisiana. As there is no data available from
the United States, a reasonable assumption is that the
infection rate will increase after the SaH order is relaxed.
If the infection rate returns to a value close to the one
at the beginning of the epidemic, the infection will grow
exponentially again. We consider two different infection
rates: 25% and 50% of the rate prior to the SaH order
and three different reopening times–May 1, May 16, and
June 1. Clearly, all these scenarios lead to a substan-
tial increase of infections and deaths, but we find that
the infection rate is more critical than the timing of the
reopening, pointing towards the importance of effective
measures to reduce the infection rate after SaH orders are
lifted. Besides lowering the infection rate, the growth can
also be slowed by increasing the sum of the testing rate
and the recovery rate of asymptomatic persons. While
the recovery rate is probably difficult to change, the test-
7ing can be expanded. This highlights the importance of
expanding testing capacity and encouraging early testing
even without severe symptoms.
There are many deficits in the present model. Im-
provement can be achieved by including additional fac-
tors, such as correlation with different age groups, the
availability of public health care, correlation with the
health condition of the population, effects of the envi-
ronment such as temperature and humidity, and many
others. Looking at less aggregated data, such as the data
for each county or metropolitan area, might also be more
meaningful than grouping the data by states which could
include multiple metropolitan areas with different disease
dynamics. It would be also interesting to study excess
deaths instead of deaths directly produced by COVID-19.
Additionally, many of the studied quantities are not ex-
pected to be Gaussian distributed. In the present work,
we take either the mean or median values of their dis-
tributions. A more sophisticated study should include
the distribution of these quantities to capture non-self-
averaging effects. Similar to most approaches based on
the SIR model, we implicitly assume that the popula-
tion is homogeneous and well mixed, and that infection
occurs without explicit time delay. It is worthwhile to
have a detailed comparison between the present study
and methods based on statistical inference of Gaussian
like distributions, such as the IHME model2.
After all, most studies of the COVID-19 spreading use
highly cross-grained approximations. The detail infection
mechanism at the local level is largely ignored. A truly
precise approach should include the dynamics of the in-
teractions among people at the local level. It is clear that
the dynamics in New York City cannot be the same as
that at the rest of New York state. This difference while
important is absent in all popular models being used for
the study of the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Utilizing a big data approach at the local level with graph
theory should provide a more meaningful detailed anal-
ysis. Given the possibility of a second wave of infection,
predictions at the local level may provide more focused
mitigation approaches to minimize the economical and
social impact of the pandemic.
In brief, perhaps the most timely information from this
study is that reopening will definitely increase the pro-
jected number of cases and fatalities, but if the infec-
tion rate can be kept to a value much lower than the
rate prior to the stay-at-home orders, the exponential
growth can be avoided. Control of the infection rate
seems to be a more critical factor than the timing of
the reopening. We have extended our approach to all
states which had more than ten COVID-19 fatalities by
April 10. Interested readers can find our predictions at
https://covid19projection.org/, where we will up-
date our projections in a timely manner. In particular,
early estimates based on real data of the evolution of the
spread after relaxing social distancing measure will be an
essential piece of information to predict and control the
repercussions of the pandemic.
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Appendix: Benchmark Against The IHME Model
Here we compare our predictions with the ones from
the IHME model2 for seven- and eleven-day time inter-
vals by subtracting from the projected death counts the
total number of deaths. Since our method captures the
effects of mitigation exclusively from the local data and
these effects are not reflected in the data until around
mid-April, both projections are for death counts on April
27.
For the seven-day projection, we take the April 21 up-
date from the IHME model which includes data through
April 202 as well as our model results using the method
described in Section III with data up to the same day. We
then compare the projected total death counts of both
models with the data seven days later on April 27. Given
the sparsity of the data, we do not expect meaningful
results can be obtained for those states which recorded
less than ten total death counts by April 10 within our
model and they are not considered. These states include
Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. The left panel of Fig. 6
displays the percentage error of the two models for the
rest of the US states. The average percentage error is
10.7% and 8.9% for the IHME model and our model,
respectively.
Then, we repeat the comparison for a longer term pro-
jection of eleven days. We take the April 17 update from
the IHME model, which includes the data up to April
16,2 and our results generated with data up to the same
day. We then compare the projected death counts of both
models with the real data eleven days later on April 27.
In this case, we also eliminate New Hampshire from the
comparison since it did not record ten total deaths by
April 6. The right panel of Fig. 6 shows the percentage
of error for both models. The average percentage error
is 15.2% for the IHME model, and 11.7% for ours. We
conclude that both model predictions are similar with
our approach slightly outperforming the IHME model.
A more thorough comparison is required to reveal the
strengths and weaknesses of different models for simulat-
ing the COVID-19 spreading.
8FIG. 6: Percentage error on the projected total death counts by April 27 of the IHME model and the present study for most
U.S. states. Positive and negative values correspond to overestimates and underestimates, respectively. Note that we have
subtracted 3,778 death counts from the IHME data for New York. Right panel: seven-day projection. Data of the IHME model
is from its April 21 update. Data of the present study is generated from data prior to the same day. The average percentage
error is 10.7% for the IHME model, and 8.9% for our approach. Left panel: eleven-day projection. Percentage error corresponds
to the projections based on data prior to April 17. The average percentage error is 15.2% for the IHME model, and 11.7% for
our model.
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